This article focuses on scientist-diplomats (disciplinary, professional, local, and global) that they represented and negotiated.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we focus on the way scientists were formally involved in diplomacy, a trend that was boosted in the twentieth century with the establishment of several international organizations. 1 The scientist-diplomats, as we call them, contributed to interweave scientific, political, and social problems, which were considered internationally relevant in these organizations. 2 We are not suggesting that scientists became involved in diplomacy and policymaking merely in the twentieth century, but we recognize that the internationalist movements influenced by two World Wars increased their institutional participation as fundamental and even autonomous actors in global issues. As Schot and Kaiser have suggested, in that period experts developed specific skills in managing international and transnational relations through "stable expert networks" in what has been called "technocratic internationalism." 3 The analysis of science in diplomacy has focused mostly on international organizations; instead we propose a biographical approach to analyse how scientists became experts along with the emergence of these forums. This is crucial for the comprehension of the complex interactions between science and state-power that are expressed through the way scientists acquired political agency in international discussions and in the definition of public policies. 4 This perspective also aims at promoting the convergence of international relations and science studies. As other scholars have noticed, the study of experts can foster constructively the combination of findings and analytical tools originating in these two fields. 5 2 The terms 'scientist diplomat' or 'scientific diplomat' have been used with similar meaning as we refer to in this paper. See The inclusion of scientists in diplomacy was not a uniform process in every national context. 6 In this paper, we analyse two cases of scientists who acted as representatives of Mexico in international organizations: Manuel Sandoval Vallarta (1899 -1977 , and Francisco de Paula Miranda . Both stood out locally and internationally because of their specialised knowledge in their respective disciplines: physics and nutrition. Their expertise matched with the need of the Mexican government to represent and defend national interests in the international organizations created in the 1940s. We examine the role these scientist-diplomats performed as experts in scientific concerns and the specificities they brought to the international arena as Mexican scientists and representatives of their nation. Furthermore, each of our cases highlights different aspects of the role of scientist-diplomats. In the case of Miranda, we provide a broad perspective of the overall shaping process of his role as scientist-diplomat through local and international forums, whereas for Sandoval Vallarta we present a more specific analysis of the scientist-diplomat's performative ability to manage a complex of interests in the context of representing a nation with a strong and distinguished tradition in foreign affairs.
Diplomacy in the first half of the twentieth century changed in important ways. It was affected by the impact of both World Wars I and II, as well as technological innovations, the consideration of new concerns in the diplomatic agenda, and the inclusion of new actors in the foreign services. 7 The creation of international organizations, such as the League of Nations (LN; 1920 , the United Nations (UN; 1942), and its multiple specialized technical agencies, introduced changes in the way traditional diplomacy was performed. In this setting, diplomatic efforts supposed that international peace would be guaranteed through these new organizations that promoted the values of democracy, commerce, economic independence and, as this article suggests, scientific rationality, into a common regulatory framework that could provide rational solutions to international challenges, in our cases, hunger and the handling of atomic energy.
Since the late nineteenth century, scientific knowledge was promoted as a crucial instrument for solving international issues, a recognition that strengthened and expanded with the creation of international organizations in the twentieth century. 8 As Speich Chassé has argued, scientific expertise was gradually incorporated into diplomacy in the interwar period, and it quickly gained a prominent position that it has kept since. 9 Then, scientists were considered as relevant actors to evaluate concerns of international politics. Many of them had no previous experience in the diplomatic service; they were newcomers in diplomacy, but nonetheless their proposals were deemed to have global repercussions. At the same time, the scientist-diplomats maintained and reinforced their position as active and influential researchers in their local scientific institutions. They also represented a professional collective with a particular role in the international arena: "scientist-lobbyists," as Jachertz has called them, 10 who combined their professional interests with their international activity. Furthermore, their scientific expertise could add values of objectivity, universalism, and truth to international decisions. From this point of view, they contributed to the justification of the geopolitics of hegemonic powers conducted through international organizations. 11 The role of scientist-diplomats expanded the spaces in which science became politically influential at local and international level. These new actors enlisted themselves with the call of governments that required scientists to be able to manage those new "weapons of peace."
Although the inclusion of scientists in the framework of diplomacy increased after the World War II, as we will see, their participation was defined as part of a former internationalist trend. 12 Prior to WWII, scientists themselves 'informally' conducted much of that international effort, as individuals or through their national and international scientific societies. After the war (and sometimes building on foundations that had been prepared for a while), the international bonds between scientists and the collaborative practices that expressed them, provided a platform for the integration of science and scientists into foreign affairs. Now they were essential not only for the development and security of the nation but also in its dealings with other states, in its efforts to project and consolidate its power in the international domain and to build a stable world order.
The scientist-diplomats analysed in this article had the specialised knowledge and scientific credentials demanded to perform as experts in the international arena, but this role was also endorsed by local scientific communities and political circles that provided them with recognition and validation in diplomatic settings, thus acquiring an agency that was not merely as technical advisors.
Meanwhile their role as scientist-diplomats contributed to reinforce their local and international prestige, Miranda and Sandoval Vallarta also profited from such prestige as feedback to maintain their consideration as the most recognised "Mexican experts" in their corresponding fields of expertise. The fact that nutritional science and nuclear physics had few specialists in Mexico-where both disciplines were still in a process of consolidation-increased their political significance. Furthermore, the international pressure, and the sense of emergency in the fields of food and atomic energy positioned these scientists in a relevant role of policy-making both in Mexico and abroad. In that sense, their roles as scientistdiplomats meant a privileged platform to promote their perspectives about how to conduct and organize science nationally and to orient policies in that respect.
This kind of expert is not only a provider of specialized knowledge, thus of scientific rationality, but also intertwines disciplinary, international, and national interests into diplomacy. 14 The scientistdiplomat introduced a more formal role for scientists in International organisations and scientists became "major agents" in "the genesis of scientific knowledge, political and commercial uses [of diet and nutrition], and social and political practices." 18 The LN produced a report with nutritional guidelines that established "on a scientific basis the causes of poverty and disease," 19 and had to be followed by its members. 20 This report was considered one of the founding papers of social nutrition science: "nutrition attentive to the social meanings of food and to poverty as the cause of malnutrition," an approach that was common to several international developments in nutrition in the 1930s and 1940s.
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Science was the answer to the problem of nutrition and hunger, and experts on nutrition were the ones that had to implement this approach.
The guidelines were incorporated in 1943 through the UN Conference on Food and Agriculture (UNCFA) that took place in Hot Springs, Virginia, USA. This meeting was the precursor of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO). The UNCFA declared its belief "that the goal of freedom from want of food, suitable and adequate for the health and strength of all peoples" could be achieved. Such optimistic belief was sustained by the increasing role of experts in the specialized commissions of that conference. The "findings and recommendations" of the experts assembled there had to be studied and adopted by the governments they represented, including countries from Latin America, Africa and Archive of the Academia Nacional de Medicina de México measures adopted by the US to prevent the appearance and spread of tropical diseases resulting from sea trade or travel. 25 Then, Miranda, an expert endocrinologist, became an enthusiast of organisations like the Red Cross and the RF, which showed the "advantages of internationalism." 26 In the 1930s, Miranda was chosen to be the head of the International Exchange Section of the SSA, a position that allowed him to attend several international conferences as the Mexican Health delegate. He was also acquainted with the newest medical literature, which he selected and translated to Spanish, and distributed among colleagues at the Ministry. 27 In the 1930s, he published articles on endocrinology and biochemistry, and was elected director of the National Academy of Medicine, the most prestigious medical association in Mexico. 28 Then, his initial interests in endocrinological disorders like diabetes moved to the field of physiology of nutrition. Miranda was familiar with the social nutrition approach and the publications of the LN. In this context, he became interested in the study of the nutritional and physiological conditions of the Mexican population.
The interest of Miranda in social nutrition grew in the middle of the 1930s when he became the head of the Comisión Nacional de Alimentación (CNA) (National Food Commission) created by the Mexican president Lázaro Cárdenas with the objective of knowing and improving the living standards of the population, by providing an optimum diet, 29 not just the minimum, one of the key arguments of understanding hunger as a social problem. 30 This Commission promoted the creation of an Institute specialized in nutrition that 25 would use science to find out the social and economic causes of malnutrition, as well as a school to train more people into this field. 31 As head of the CNA, Miranda and the International Health Division of the RF coordinated local nutritional surveys by the end of the 1930s, a collaboration that would last for most part of the 1940s. 32 The surveys provided information about the food consumption habits of the diverse population groups that inhabited Mexico, focusing on peasants, indigenous populations and urbanpoor dwellers. The latter would be reframed as "models" of the Mexican population, undernourished and susceptible to improvement through social engineering. 33 The findings were part of the evidence of the social nutrition approach taking place in Mexico that Miranda brought to the UNCFA at Hot Springs. 34 Miranda explained at the UNCFA that poverty was "the predominant cause of malnutrition" in Mexico, so his government was taking important measures to attack the "problem of nutrition," such as improving local food consumption through social welfare programs, and creating specialised educational programmes on nutrition and hygiene. He also proposed that all those policies had to be replicated at the international context as part of the objectives of the UNCFA. The Mexican Delegation statement, written by Miranda, emphasised the new nutritional research conducted at the new Instituto Nacional de Nutriología 31 Aurea Procel, Memorandum que la profesora Aurea Procel presenta al C.
Presidente de la República, acerca del establecimiento en México, por cooperación internacional, de un Instituto encargado de investigar lo relativo a la alimentación popular (Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Manuel Ávila Camacho, 103202; México, 1941). 32 The RF had had an important role in the spread of scientific medicine in the first half of the twentieth century, and Miranda's case illustrates the diverse array of social skills, academic and political factors that made him a nutrition expert. Miranda was recognized as an authoritative voice from Mexico in the international meetings he attended, but his expert advice was also relevant at the local level. However, he also entangled the global with the local approach; global recommendations had to be contextualized when practiced, and local experts on international committees presupposed the creation of universal standards which could and should be followed by everyone. These early years of the technical divisions of the UN, seems to follow the ideals of the interwar period of the use of science and diplomacy as instruments for peace, suggesting more continuations than ruptures from the Interwar period. 43 The technical committees were just "the apex of a complex structure that brought into active association thousands of health workers worldwide." 44 Similar conditions prevailed in other UN technical agencies, as the following case of Sandoval Vallarta will show.
MANAGING NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY AMONG ATOMIC ENERGY CONCERNS, NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, AND SCIENTIFIC INTERNATIONALISM
The previous section considers a panoramic view of the trajectory of a Mexican expert in nutrition, pointing out the mutual reinforcement of status from local to international back and forth. This section analyses the participation of a scientist-diplomat in a specific international meeting, in order to dig into the type of interactions of national interests, global geopolitics, and specialised knowledge that a scientist-diplomat had to balance and mediate with.
The creation of an international commission devoted to atomic energy had become an urgent task after the detonation of the atomic bombs in Japan in 1945. In this scenario, in December of that year a meeting was organized in Moscow by the Council of Foreign Ministers with representatives of the five permanent state members of the United Nations' Security Council: the United States of America (US), the United Kingdom (UK), China, France, and the Soviet Union (USSR). They proposed the creation of a commission for the international control and regulation of atomic energy, which would be subordinated to the Security Council (SC), as suggested by the US and UK representatives. 45 Moreover, the resolutions taken by the commission would be subjected to the power of veto, following the USSR stance. 46 Consequently, the first meeting of the UN's General Assembly, which took place in London in January 1946, voted as its inaugural agreement the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). 47 The AEC would be in charge of the following issues: to regulate the international exchange of scientific information; to secure the use of atomic energy for pacific purposes; to eliminate nuclear weapons; and to secure peace through regular inspections for protecting other nations against violations of international agreements on the uses of atomic energy. The AEC would be constituted by representatives of the five state members of the SC, jointly with Canada, and the non-permanent state members elected then by the UN General Assembly (Australia, Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, the Netherlands, and Poland were a man of a high scientific level who, because of his discipline and activities, was able to understand all aspects of the problem and to speak with authority." 49 By doing so, the Mexican diplomatic service opened a way to the official appointment of a scientist-diplomat, a man whose specialized knowledge gave him the authority to speak and defend the national interests.
In fact, the Mexican Foreign Service went through a process of professionalisation, redefinition, and enlargement favoured by the creation of post-war international organisations. 50 For instance, during the celebration of the AEC meeting, the Mexican Foreign Secretary requested a physicist to occupy a permanent position associated with the representation of the country at the UN, an expert who would assist in issues of atomic energy. 51 For the Mexican government the best understanding of atomic energy concerned the field of physics (although this topic crossed other disciplines, such as chemistry, medicine or engineering). That association demanded as never before the inclusion of a physicist among diplomatic delegations. Regarding the designation of the Mexican delegate at the AEC, the SRE expressed that having a physicist for this diplomatic mission was crucial. This was made clear when after the suggestion of appointing someone with experience in the Mexican diplomatic service, the SRE asserted that this alternative was "not really satisfactory" since the suggested diplomat lacked of "the technical knowledge, Sandoval Vallarta built and consolidated his scientific authority during his career in the US. 57 He was trained as a theoretical physicist at MIT, where he got a Ph.D. in 1924, and was an active professor in the Department of Physics until 1941. He was part of the first MIT generation specialising in quantum physics and he became a prominent scientist because of his theoretical research in cosmic rays. Certainly, Sandoval Vallarta had the theoretical knowledge about the subatomic world to understand the scientific and technical details about atomic energy. Though, to be precise, his research was not directly related to the wide range of topics, materials and instruments related to the area of atomic energy and its military or peaceful uses, such as nuclear weaponry, radioisotopes, radioactive materials, particle accelerators, or nuclear reactors.
In addition to his scientific credentials, Sandoval Vallarta built a close relationship to the Mexican government, gaining access to public appointments. Since his family had been relevant in Mexican political history, he continued this lineage by reaching an important role as an interlocutor mediating science and politics. 58 Actually, one of the reasons he decided to return from the US to his native country was because of a proposal from the Mexican government to head a national organisation for the encouragement and coordination of scientific research. 59 Thus he reconfigured his scientific career as a Mexican scientist after he had developed professionally in the US for twenty-five years. In that sense, his participation as a scientist-diplomat was part of this professional shift.
Furthermore, through this geographical and professional relocation Sandoval Vallarta continued with his previous performance on the uses of science in diplomacy. During WWII, he collaborated with the US government in the promotion of its Good Neighbor Policy through the exchange of scientific publications between Latin American and US scientists. 60 In this manner, he had played a role as a kind of informal (US) scientific ambassador. After the war, his formal engagement in diplomacy was configured as a scientist expert in nuclear issues representing then the interests of the Mexican government.
According to the instructions the SRE gave to Sandoval Vallarta, the official position of Mexico in the AEC had to be consistent with the main national foreign policy principles, as well as the recommendations presented by the Economy Secretary and the Law Service. For the Mexican government, the major issue to defend was the property of natural resources. In fact, the nationalisation of radioactive deposits was the first reaction of the Mexican government after the detonation of nuclear bombs. 61 The During WWII, the Mexican and US governments improved their international relations. 62 In that period, the Mexican government followed a non-intervention foreign policy, maintaining the political independence that characterized its participation in international forums during the Cold War. 63 Mexico forged an ambivalent position that waved between its non-intervention policy and its alliances with the US, which was reflected in the position represented by Sandoval Vallarta at the AEC. His diplomatic discourse there included both claims for collaboration and for sovereignty: "the propositions presented by [the US representative] are acceptable to Mexico, although the issue about the property of uranium minerals would need a careful and separate study yet." 64 The AEC first meeting took place between June and December of 1946. Mexico belonged to this Commission only during the time of its effective membership into the UN's Security Council, that was only for one year. Sandoval Vallarta stood out as the only head delegate who was a scientist. The rest were politicians, army officials, or professionals of the diplomatic service in their respective countries. 65 Of course, each delegation had technical advisers, among them well-known nuclear physicists such as the UK delegate James Chadwick, and the French delegates Frédéric Joliot-Curie and Francis Perrin. 66 For Mexico, the group that accompanied the delegation included an army official, a physicist, and an engineer. 67 The combination of scientists, politicians, and army officials reveals the formation of the hybrid space of negotiations and exchanges that characterised nuclear diplomacy.
In general, the AEC discussion was centred on the international control of atomic energy, a plan presented by the US, called the Baruch Plan, and the rival Soviet proposal. 68 The plan of the US consisted in the creation of an international organisation with capacity to determine and sanction the activities related to atomic energy that imply a risk to world security. Moreover, it proposed that the organisation would concentrate all the information about resources of atomic fuel. Furthermore, its decisions would not be subject to the Security Council veto. Instead, the USSR suggested organising first an international convention in which each country would inform about their nuclear armament and after that, they would compromise to destroy it. Only in that premise, would it be possible to create an international organisation for the regulation of atomic energy. For the Soviet government, it was essential that the AEC would maintain the power to veto.
Certainly, these two proposals dominated the work of the AEC, but as the Mexican position suggests, to consider that bipolar geopolitics was implied as the only force that drove discussions in this forum would be an oversimplification. The Mexican government, on the one hand, supported the position of the US regarding the elimination of the power of veto with regard to matters that belonged to the AEC. On the other hand, Mexico promoted the nationalisation of radioactive deposits. As pointed out by the Mexican delegate, "it was convened to establish the obligation in each country that possesses uranium deposits to nationalize them, just as Mexico and the United States have done, and to sell the products of these deposits to the claimed in turn that each country had to receive an amount of the refined products, which were extracted from the national territory. Regarding mines and atomic energy facilities, the Mexican government proposed that inspections should be conducted not only by AEC officials, but also by local experts. 70 The Mexican delegation clearly stated the property of natural resources, whatever they were, as a matter of an inalienable national principle, an issue that was at the core of the formation of post-revolutionary Mexico.
Since there was not an agreement resulting of this first AEC meeting, the impact of the Mexican position is not evident. But attending issues as those stated by the Mexican representation at the AEC, enables a more complete understanding of the manifold complex processes that shaped post-war nuclear diplomacy. Gabrielle Hecht has demonstrated the importance of thinking in terms of broader processes instead of only key moments of high bipolar politics about nuclear programs. 71 Following a similar perspective, Jacques Hymans underlines the importance of Mexico in nuclear politics for its promotion of non-proliferation treaties in the 1960s that secured Latin America as a nuclear weapon free zone. 72 It was neither in this meeting, nor in the two hundred that followed, that an international agreement was achieved, with the result that the AEC was suspended in 1949. 73 It was not until 1957 that an agreement about the international regulation of atomic energy was reached. 74 However, the AEC played an important role as a forum where crucial themes of the international agenda emerged, such as the political forces that came to prevail during the Cold War. Moreover, the distinction of peaceful uses of atomic energy that started then to be delineated, years later justified the US international scientific policy of Atoms for Peace. 75 Sandoval Vallarta's specialized knowledge was important for his recruitment as scientist-diplomat, but it was not decisive in terms of defining the position he defended during his participation in the AEC. Even in the Subcommittee of technical aspects of atomic energy, which supervised the scientific and technical feasibility of monitoring nuclear activities, Sandoval Vallarta and other members expressed the view that it was not possible to discuss scientific aspects of atomic energy independently of political issues. On the occasion that Mexico led the AEC meeting for some weeks, Sandoval Vallarta gave an inaugural discourse dedicated to the defence of internationalism in science and the free exchange of scientific information:
The future of pure scientific research is at stake […] for without a satisfactory form of control of atomic energy there is a great danger that research leading to the discovery of scientific truths will eventually stop altogether; that the exchange of scientific information will be so seriously curtailed as to disrupt the international brotherhood of science; that scientists will devote their efforts to the invention of more deadly means of warfare and will work in segregated groups, each bent on securing for his respective nation the greatest possible advantage of war. 76 These words reflect his concerns about the challenges for science in relation to the atomic energy discussions. Since 1945, Sandoval Vallarta sustained the notion that scientists had to assume their historical compromise and intervene in the definition of the uses of atomic energy, even from politics, to maintain the ideal of internationalism in science, as he tried by representing Mexico at the AEC. 77 The role of Sandoval Vallarta as expert in issues of atomic energy, made him part of the main national committees in this scientific aspect, contributing to the strengthening of nuclear physics research. Whereas Sandoval Vallarta as a scientist-diplomat represented national interests according to the government's dictates, an advantageous position as such also set the pattern for opening direct political channels allowing the negotiation of governmental support for science, and the increase of technical, instrumental, institutional, and professional capacities.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper exposes the journey followed by two Mexican scientists while positioning themselves as experts and national representatives in the international organizations created at the dawn of the Post-war period. The role of this kind of expert in international organisations, and the definition itself of these organisations suggests in principle a genuine interest of integrating approaches from different national scientific communities in resulting agreements. The participation of Mexican scientistdiplomats in international organisations for nutrition and atomic energy shows that, although the geopolitical world order and economic asymmetry guided most of the decisions of these technical agencies, they were validated by a collective (international) scientific rationality. What is more, despite the apparently low impact of the proposals put forward by Mexican scientistdiplomats, certainly their participation contributed to reinforce their privileges at national and international level.
Francisco de Paula Miranda and Manuel Sandoval Vallarta were scientists that emphasised international collaboration in their careers, an element that became an important feature to intervene in the shaping of scientific cooperation as an effective instrument for the maintenance of international peace. Both scientists had in common their strong connections with the US scientific community, being acquainted with its traditions and practices. This influenced their research and the local scientific institutions they created. Their strategy of scientific collaboration kept feeding their international projection and conferred to them a distinguished status in their local scientific communities.
Miranda, and Sandoval Vallarta were pioneers in their respective disciplines in Mexico. The Mexican government took advantage of their expertise by recruiting them as national representatives in their diplomatic delegations in international meetings. Their commitment with the promotion of scientific internationalism and their local and international networks, made them ideal to participate in diplomacy. Both became scientist-diplomats, whose authority was not based solely on their specialized knowledge, but also on the international networks of knowledge and the political alliances they created along their career path. That diversity of sources of legitimation was also present in the commitments they defended, which converged in their belief in science as a weapon of peace.
An important current in the study of experts in Latin America has focused on those technocrats who, particularly from the 1960s, encouraged social, political, and economic development initiatives. This article expands the understanding of scientists as experts that have also contributed to delineate public policies in this region. Furthermore, scientists have also been absent from Mexican diplomatic history, but this article illustrates the importance of paying attention to their interventions in international settings. More studies are required to get deeper into the relation of science and diplomacy in this historical field. Finally, this article exemplifies the interest of studying scientist-diplomats by promoting further interaction between the history of international relations and science studies.
